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ABSTRACT 
 
The informal economy constitutes the bulk of employment in many emerging economies. 
Regulation theory suggests that all economic activity is characterized by a complex 
combination of formal and informal regulation. This article explores the pressures toward and 
against formalization, and what forms regulation can take, based on the case of Mozambique, 
and drawing on qualitative research involving elite interviews and observation. The findings 
highlight how the state may take a modernizing role, incorporating infrastructural 
development and formal regulation, yet also sustain conservative elements, tolerating: 
informal activity in the interests of political stability, infringements of employment rights, 
informal regulation and expropriation of space and natural resources.  In theoretical terms, 
this paper highlights the limitations of accounts that focus on formal regulation; economic 
activity may be contingent on institutional mediation, but the primary basis of regulation may 
be informal. In countries such as Mozambique that have faced a troubled past, it should 
arguably be accepted by local and international institutions that the way forward will entail 
incremental change.  
 
Key words: Mozambique, Africa, regulation, informal economy 
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TOWARDS AND AGAINST FORMALIZATION: REGULATION AND CHANGE IN 
INFORMAL WORK IN MOZAMBIQUE 
 
  
This is a study of regulation, formalization and persistent informality, examining the informal 
sector in Mozambique. It is commonly assumed that the informal sector in Africa is an 
unregulated realm (see Castells & Portes, 1989). However, in contrast to much of the 
mainstream literature on development, developments in regulation theory suggest that 
economic activity is not characterized by weak or absent regulation, but that a greater role is 
accorded to informal regulation in peripheral areas of national economies (Coetzee, Graaf, 
Hendricks & Wood, 1996; c.f. Jessop, 2001). This article explores what forms the regulation 
of the informal sector can assume, and the pressures towards and mitigating against 
formalization. The term ‘formalization’ is complex and value laden. It implies that the logic 
of state intervention is towards formalization, when in practice, the state may promote or 
sustain ‘informalization’ when vested interests favour either agenda (Harriss-White, 2010). 
 The first section explores differing accounts of the relationship between regulation 
and the informal sector. The following section reports the results of an evaluation of informal 
employment in Mozambique, a southern African developing economy, drawing on in-depth 
elite interviews and observational research, and builds on existent literature on employment 
and institutional development within Mozambique (see, for example, Webster, Wood & 
Brookes, 2006; Cramer, Oya and Sender, 2008; Lindell, 2008; Wood, Dibben, Stride & 
Webster, 2010; Dibben, 2010; Dibben & Nadin, 2011; Dibben & Williams, 2012; Dibben & 
Wood, 2013). The analysis of findings highlights the complexities of regulating for 
formalization due to the ambivalent role of both state and market in driving and blocking 
formalization, incorporating both conservative and modernizing influences.i. In highlighting 
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the challenges inherent in moving toward formalization, this article has wider implications 
for those economies attempting to move from emerging to advanced economy status. 
Mozambique is a useful case study in this regard due to its relative economic success and 
progressive employment regulation, yet persistently high levels of poverty, with much 
reliance on informal sector work (AfDB/ OECD, 2008; World Bank Group, 2009).  
 In this paper, we use the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of the 
informal economy as including employment within informal sector enterprises and informal 
employment outside of the informal sector where the employment relationship is not covered 
in law or in practice by national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or 
entitlement to certain employment benefits (ILO, 2010). As with many African countries, in 
Mozambique, the informal economy is diverse, encompassing street and (prevalent in the 
rural areas) roadside trading, the home production of goods and services, informal workers 
(employed in informal businesses and by unregulated labour brokers), informal and 
unregulated goods and public transport (both by road and artisanal shipping), illegal trading 
of goods. The divisions between formality and informality are not always absolute. Formal 
workplaces may choose not to declare some of their workers to the authorities, (see, for 
example, Bischoff and Wood, 2013), or fail to comply with certain labour regulations 
(Kanbur, Ronconi & Wedenoja, 2013; Bischoff and Wood 2013). Moreover and within 
supply relations, informal and formal sectors may work closely together to bring costs down, 
and place the formal sector at arms length from legal transgressions. An example of this 
would be the relationship between the often illegal woodcutters, and charcoal burners of 
northern rural Mozambique, local brokers and, ultimately, charcoal processers and packers 
for export markets. Whilst this study primarily focuses on evidence gathered on street trading 
and informal employment, much of the evidence has a broader relevance in understanding 
informal living. In line with established usage, we use the words ‘informal sector’ throughout 
5 
 
this paper, but acknowledge that the sector encompasses many areas of economic activity, 
and that the borders with the more formal sector are frequently unclear and permeable. For 
example, informal activities can subsidize formal ones through the use of outsourcing, and 
through making goods and services cheaper for formal sector organizations (Chen, 2007). In 
addition, there can be some blurring regarding formality and legality, with a misconception 
that the informal sector is always illegal (Chen, 2007).  Illegal activity is used here to refer to 
the trade of illegal goods (rather than working practices outside the law or illegal 
transgressions in terms of trading place). In contrast, the term informal employment is taken 
to mean that the activity is ‘hidden from or unregistered with the authorities for tax, social 
security and/or labour law purposes’ but the good/ service supplied is not illegal (Williams 
and Lansky, 2013: 358). Although around 75 percent of the workforce is employed within the 
informal economy or agricultural work (AfDB/OECD, 2008; CIA, 2010), it is difficult to be 
precise on figures, since new businesses start up every day, while others close due to 
bankruptcy or movement into the formal economy (Amurane, 2007). According to some 
estimates, approximately 7.6 million Mozambicans are employed in the informal non-
agricultural sector, compared to only about 800 000 in the formal sector (Amurane, 2007). A 
large proportion of informal sector and agricultural workers are women (Chen, 2007). In 
Mozambique, women form one of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in the 
labour market (ILO, 2012), with less access to income-generating activities (World Bank, 
2008 in ILO, 2012). This situation has implications for the likelihood of broader economic 
development. In addition, in rural areas women are more likely to lack permanent jobs or 
receive in-work benefits (Cramer, Oya and Sender, 2008). Within the informal sector in 
Mozambique – as elsewhere in the world – certain occupations are also dominated by 
women, including the preparation and sale of street food, the making and sale of traditional 
alcoholic beverages, and personal services such as laundry and child care.  
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In using Mozambique as a case study, it is important to acknowledge the influence of 
its colonial past, which (at over 500 years) was much longer than most other African 
countries (South Africa included). In simple terms, the form of colonialism was a relatively 
backward one, geared to trade and the extraction of raw materials; only in the closing years of 
colonial rule was there a significant investment in infrastructure, but one focused primarily on 
promoting the trade and port facilities of neighbouring states (Newitt 1995; Haines & Wood, 
1995; Isaacman & Isaacman 1976). This lop-sidedness has persisted (Pitcher, 2002; Wood 
and Dibben, 2007; Phiri, 2012). Two other features of colonialism have left an abiding 
institutional legacy. The first is the weakness of the Portuguese state.  In the early years of 
colonization, the authorities delegated authority in the central Zambesi basin to praesideos or 
sertenejos, adventurers who were either formally or informally allocated areas of territory to 
govern with the primary function of resource extraction (Newitt, 1995; Isaacman & 
Isaacman, 1976). Their replacement in the late nineteenth century with more direct rule did 
not always result in effective government, and even in more recent times, it has been argued 
that official regulatory capabilities (and interest) rapidly diminish away from the principal 
urban centres (see Pitcher, 2002). The second is the importance of extended family networks 
in underpinning economic activity amongst the bulk of settlers and the indigenous peasant 
majority (Pitcher, 2002; Newitt, 1995). The political context is also relevant to understanding 
the role of the state. The country is now ruled by a democratically elected government. The 
dominant party, Frelimo, was the principal liberation movement during the struggle for 
independence, and formed the founding government following independence from Portugal 
in 1975. Renamo, a former rightwing rebel movement, is the main opposition party. Whilst in 
early democratic elections it proved capable of mounting a serious electoral threat to Frelimo, 
in recent years, the lack of effective leadership has overwhelmed the party. In practical terms, 
this means that Mozambique is now a dominant party system, with what appeared, until 
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recently, to be an ineffective opposition.  However, in 2013, Renamo returned to armed 
struggle due to its diminishing stake in the existing order, arguing that elected Renamo 
officials had been systematically marginalized (AllAfrica.com, 2014a). Other issues raised 
have included chronic underdevelopment and controversial land allocations in Renamo’s 
rural heartland. In a move that appears to be aimed at securing a stake in the potential 
revenues flowing from the rapidly growing hydrocarbons sector (notably coal and gas), 
Renamo has seized control of significant areas of rural central Mozambique (AllAfrica.com, 
2014b). This has disrupted public transport and trade and, by extension trade centred informal 
livelihoods, and the forcing of peasants back to subsistence agriculture.  However, the full 
implications of this recent development remain unclear.   
  
(1) REGULATING THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
The following sections address, in turn, the potential attitudes of the state toward the formal 
sector, and alternative strategies for moving toward formalization. 
 
 
(a) Rethinking the state and formalization 
  
The literature on employment relations and human resource management (HRM) in emerging 
economies encompasses explorations of paternalist styles of management, the methods used 
in selection and recruitment such as informal patronage, and the way in which HR practices, 
in common with everyday relationships, are underpinned by an understanding of reciprocal 
rights and duties (Kamoche, 2002; Jackson, 2002; Sartorius, Merino and Carmichael, 2012).  
The latter encompasses issues ranging from employment strategies to access to informal 
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credit.   The informal sector has traditionally been represented within modernization theories 
as a residue of forms of economic activity not yet absorbed into the modern formal economy 
(Geertz, 1963), backward and outside of modern economic institutions. It is held that the 
absorption of the informal sector could be speeded up through top-down policy interventions, 
changing the cost/benefit ratio for rational economic actors engaged, or thinking of engaging 
in, such work through improving the perceived or actual likelihood of detection, and raising 
the penalties for those caught.     
  More recently, however, it has been acknowledged that informal employment is 
extensive, persistent and even growing relative to formal employment in many populations 
(Feige & Urban, 2008; Schneider, 2008). This has raised questions about the relationship 
between informal activity and national and regional institutional configurations (Nafziger 
1988). Rather than being an ‘incorrect’ choice, the neoliberal argument is that informal 
activity might represent voluntary exit from the formal economy because of greater 
autonomy, flexibility and freedom in informal employment, thus avoiding taxes and 
inefficient government regulation (Gerxhani, 2004). From this perspective, informal 
employment is viewed as a direct result of the over-regulation of the market (de Soto, 1989), 
which stifles economic activity. Thus, a laissez-faire approach is sometimes advocated 
towards informal employment and a de-regulatory approach towards the formal economy, re-
orientating state intervention toward a primary focus on protecting property rights. The 
distinction between formal and informal employment will then disappear and the informal 
economy will be legitimate. Appropriate measures include: decreases in taxation; a drastic 
reduction in the regulations of formal employment; benefit reforms; training and advice and 
business start-up grants (Sepulveda & Syrett, 2007).  
 Theories of state failure (c.f. Hyden, 1983; Nafziger, 1988) similarly view the rise of 
the informal sector as a response to institutional shortcomings. More specifically, it is held 
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that within many developing world contexts, the state lacks a broad basis in society, and is 
interpenetrated by extended informal peasant based networks of support which debilitate it 
(Hyden, 1983). In the absence of effective and neutral governance, large proportions of 
society opt out of formal regulation, relying on informal mechanisms of subsistence.  
However, in these accounts, the rise of the informal sector is seen as essentially destructive, 
rather than something to celebrate.  Informal work is unregulated, low paid and insecure, and 
engaged in due to no other options being available (Castells & Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; 
Gallin, 2001). Cut-throat competition from the informal sector will erode the position of 
formal sector players, debasing labour standards, reducing the tax base, and contributing to 
social disorder (Moody, 1987; c.f. Hyden, 1983), while most informal sector activity is 
insecure, low paid, hazardous, and often coercive (Harriss-White, 2010) and never moves 
beyond the level of basic subsistence (see Harrison, 2000).  
 Much of the early literature on state failure assumed that capitalist development was a 
necessary stage en route to more advanced forms of social organization (Hyden, 1983). 
However, as Harvey (2003) notes, capitalist development can be characterized by reenergized 
primitive accumulation, driving a reversion to pre-modern ways of doing things, rather than 
modernization; small elites may experience a rapid increase in their personal prosperity, but 
to the detriment of society at large. Moreover, seeking to resolve the problems of state failure 
by reducing its capabilities may in fact worsen tendencies to adversarial competition and/or 
crony capitalism (c.f. Balakrishnan, 2009): leaner government does not necessarily mean 
better or fairer. 
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(b) Informality and regulation 
 
Regulation theory assumes that all forms of economic activity require institutional mediation 
in order to impart a degree of predictability to commercial exchanges, facilitate information 
flows and ensure a basic degree of continuity (Jessop, 2001; Boyer, 2003, Boyer, 2006).  
Regulation theory is not so much a theory of formal regulation, but is based on the working 
together of formal and informal regulation (ibid.). Hence, the question is not about whether 
the informal sector is subject to some type of institutional mediation, but what form the latter 
assumes. In contrast to the functionalist tradition, regulation theory draws a distinction 
between the minimal type of institutional mediation that allows for (potentially volatile and 
unstable) economic activity to take place, and a growth regime, the latter reflecting coherent 
institutional frameworks that make for stable economic growth across a wide range of sectors 
(Boyer, 2003; 2006).  Informal rules and norms may be more deeply embedded and more 
resilient than formal ones: at the same time, they are less comprehensible to outsiders, raising 
transaction costs, and may be narrowly spatially confined (c.f. Jessop, 2001).    
 In some cases, the nature of informal sector regulation may diverge from that which 
governs the formal sector, but may be carried out by the same institutions, with variations in 
the operation and enforcement of formal rules and in relative governmental support. For 
example, there may be embedded conventions as to where specific types of informal traders 
may operate, the tithes or rents that should be paid and the relative scope of activity (c.f. 
Harrison, 2000; Hanlon, 2004). Another example is the regulation of labour. There is often an 
expectation that informal sector operatives should, in resourcing labour, give first preference 
to extended family or others with close personal ties (see Harrison, 2000; Amurane, 2007). 
However, these networks also perform a disciplinary and regulatory function, mediating the 
operationalization of the employment contract in the absence of effective labour law (c.f. 
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Marsden, 1999; De Vletter, 1996). However, institutions may not be mutually supportive, and 
there may be a partial decoupling between formally constituted national institutional 
frameworks and the informal institutions and associated regulation governing informal 
working (c.f. Jessop, 2001). This loose institutional coupling makes coordination, 
compatibility and complementarity between different manifestations of economic activity 
more difficult (Boyer, 2006). In contrast, formality may impart a greater clarity, accessibility 
(not only insiders know all the rules) and predictability (see Jessop, 2001), implying the need 
to move the informal economy closer to the formal realm, as the basis for a coherent growth 
regime. However, as Boyer (2006) notes, institutional change does not necessarily come 
about through coherent policy interventions, but may reflect opportunism or serendipity.   
 
(c) The ambivalent role of the state 
 
The role of the authorities as an agent of formalization may, in fact, be ambivalent.  
Conservatism might be adhered to since political patrons may not wish to alienate their 
clients, who in turn, may be reluctant to abandon precarious livings for an unknown or 
abstract alternative. Governments may also fear political instabilityii. Moreover, petty and 
not-so-petty representatives of the authorities may become themselves dependent on the 
informal extraction of rents from informal traders (c.f. Marcouiller & Young, 1995), or drive 
the expropriation of the goods and space of informal traders in order to enrich favoured 
entrepreneurs, national and/or local politicians, and/or to enable petty officials to subsist in 
the absence of decent pay (Wood, 2004; c.f. Baker, 2001). Weak and poor states are the least 
equipped to resist calls for a reduced role for the state, removing the possibilities for a 
renewed statist developmental trajectory. This means that formalization will, at best be of the 
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ad hoc variety. At worst, the state may engage in rent extraction and outright expropriation 
from those engaged in informal activity.  
 On the other hand, the state may seek to promote greater formalization in order to 
pursue a modernization agenda, perceiving that encouragement is more beneficial than 
punitive measures (Loayza & Rigolini, 2011). This may be done through providing the 
facilities and support for informal entrepreneurs to formalize their activities, through job 
creation, to drive out the need for informal work, and/or via coercion, forcing informal 
traders out in the hope that formal ones will take their place.  Such moves may be light touch 
and ad hoc, within a broad neo-liberal policy framework or as part of a more coherent and 
integrated state directed trajectory of capitalist development.   
 
(2) METHODS FOR EXAMINING INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE 
 
The findings draw on primary documents and statistical data in addition to observational 
research undertaken in Mozambique over almost twenty years. The research was exploratory 
and incremental and, included 58 in-depth ‘elite’ interviews held between 2005 and 2009 
with participants at director level in a range of stakeholder organizations including: 
government departments such as Industry, Commerce, Quality Standards and Privatization; 
employer and trade union bodies; ASSOTSI, the main organization representing the informal 
sector; a Mozambican news agency; and non-governmental organizations. Interviews with 
senior officials could not provide an exhaustive account of marginalized areas of economy 
and society, but represented a wide range stakeholder interests - a caveat being that both 
unions and ASSOTSI focus their efforts on major urban centres, with workers and traders in 
peripheral areas being largely unorganized. The focus on elite interviews enables in-depth 
exploration of regulation and the institutional context. The lack of interviews with informal 
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sector workers is arguably a limitation of the paper.  However, existing work on livelihoods 
provides detail on the lived experiences of those directly working on the land and within the 
informal sector (see, for example, Cramer, Oya and Sender, 2008). Moreover, observational 
techniques have provided some insights into the relationships between informal sector 
workers and regulatory bodies.  Between 1992 and 2005 observational work was carried out 
within more remote areas, and in 2005-2009 in urban areas, with some common trends being 
apparent. The interviews were also supplemented by primary documents and existing 
research, and, wherever possible, specific points were independently corroborated from a 
range of alternative sources. Based on this, it can be concluded that the principal finding – of 
informal and formal regulation promoting both conservative and modernizing influences on 
the formalization of work - remains true across the country, albeit that the form may vary 
according to sector and locale.  
The interviews were semi-structured, including pre-determined questions but also 
eliciting further information through prompts and probes. In 2005 and 2006, interviews 
focused on the political, economic, and regulatory context, while those in 2007 and 2009 
were directed towards understanding employment relations and the regulation of the informal 
sector. Perceptions of cultural norms were not directly sought, but nevertheless, the 
interviews revealed insights into accepted rules and behaviours. All interviews were fully 
transcribed, and lasted between one and two hours. 
 Within the scope of this study, it was not possible to interview those working within 
the informal economy although including the voices of those directly involved would be a 
useful extension of this work, as would updated in-depth research in more rural areas in order 
to build on existent work in this area. This study also primarily focuses on street trading and 
informal labour; more hidden forms of informal activity, including much criminal activity are 
much harder to document, as is a fuller documentation of the role of the authorities in 
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extracting tithes and/or in enforcing the law.  Analysis of data was undertaken using NVivo, a 
computerized package used for the analysis of non-numerical data. Each transcribed 
interview was imported into the system. Drawing on the literature, a hierarchical coding 
system was developed in order to assist in the conceptualization of the data (Richards & 
Richards, 1994), and transcripts were then coded accordingly, with new themes emerging in 
some cases.  
The findings centre on two central research questions. Firstly, whilst much existing 
work on Mozambique has centred on formal regulatory failures (Hanlon, 2004; Pitcher, 
2000), much of this work tends to neglect the inherent ambiguity of a state that has sought to 
formalize work while moving from post-socialist to capitalism, and from a developing 
economy to an emerging one. Hence, the first question considers the apparent attitudes of the 
Mozambican state toward formalization. Secondly, whilst all economic activity depends on 
some form of regulation, a sustainable, stable and predictable movement toward the 
formalization of work is contingent on functional regulation.  Hence, the second research 
question centres on the extent to which the regulation currently in place acts as a conservative 
or modernizing influence on formalization.  
 
(3) FINDINGS 
 
Governments in emerging economies can face pressures toward and against formalization. 
The latter might be influenced by notions that the retaining of informal sector activity can 
contribute toward poverty reduction, social stability and economic benefits. Thus, there are 
pressures toward preserving the status quo.  
 
(a) Government and the Informal Economy: Preserving the Status Quo? 
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To what extent is the Mozambican government drawn toward sustaining informality? An 
important factor concerning the Mozambican government is the aim for poverty reduction. 
Thus, the growth of the informal economy is valuable in reducing poverty:  
 
The government recognizes that the informal sector supports the development of 
country in its fight against poverty as many people are without employment. And 
[working in the informal sector gives them] something to look after their children and 
[provide them with] education.  It is not easy to survive (Director A, OTM, 2005). 
 
Of those working in the informal sector, a large proportion consists of women (Willems et al., 
2006). Of these, some are married women supplementing their husband’s income, while 
single women include widows who have a family to support (President, ASSOTSI, 2009).   
Many of the workers within the informal economy are organized by ASSOTSI an 
association that has a membership of 40,000 informal workers and operators, and is an 
affiliate of the OTM trade union federation; the OTM was originally the union wing of the 
ruling party, but since the late 1980s has asserted greater independence. According to the 
President of ASSOTSI (Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal), the 
informal economy is also viewed as a permanent feature of the economy (President of 
ASSOTSI, 2009) due to fears of political and social instability. Moreover, attempts to remove 
informal traders by force have often failed: 
 
There has been more than one attempt to try to dismantle the [informal] market but it 
was impossible and the government has come to realize, no [this is not sensible]. The 
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former mayor tried to get rid of that market but he became so unpopular. It’s the way 
of living of so many people (Director of Mozambican News Agency, 2009).  
 
A further reason for retaining the informal economy is its economic contribution. Informal 
sector traders, although not providing income taxes, are nevertheless required to pay fees in 
order to sell goods in markets.   
 
The government is accepting [of the informal sector], because it is individual 
business...If you are paying your taxes the government is not interested to know who 
you are (President of ASSOTSI, 2009). 
 
As a result of these pressures, there has also apparently been toleration of illegal activity. 
Illegal goods are commonly available within informal markets (Director of Mozambican 
News Agency, 2009). Moreover, the police role appears to have changed over the years from 
repression to tolerance (Director, News Agency, 2009). This is reportedly due to the role of 
the trade union and ASSOTSI (the organization representing the informal sector): 
  
...the people who are selling things in the streets now are organized by ASSOTSI.  
The government and police are not allowed to go there and shoot them- they have 
been organized by ASSOTSI (President of ASSOTSI, 2009).  
 
The changing role of the police has also been influenced by a number of other factors. The 
real wages of the police declined over much of the 1990s, and during the time of 
liberalization, they acquired a predatory reputation. Those working in the informal sector, 
fearful of the police, consequently fled from the police and were named ‘dumba-nengues’ 
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meaning ‘trust your legs’. Not only street traders, but also motorists, tourists and businessmen 
were subject to demands for tithes, and/or fined for petty or imagined offences, with refusal 
resulting in threats of, or actual, imprisonment (see Baker, 2003; Berg, 2005)iii. Police 
harassment of tourists has since declined, with government concerns about the potential 
damage to a burgeoning tourist economy.   
During the most recent research trip in 2009, we did not initially observe police 
hassling street traders, but on the 14th day a uniformed policeman appeared to be 
reprimanding street traders. However, closer inspection revealed that the policeman was not 
warning or arresting the traders, but in fact only having his shoes cleaned (Fieldnotes, 
September 2009).  
 Nevertheless, the state and its agents are not universally tolerant of informal activities, 
particularly in the case of illegal imports, and alcohol. For example, there are periodic 
confiscations of such products (Director, Mozambican News Agency, 2009; Senior Editor, 
Mozambican News Agency, 2009). More generally, corruption among public officials 
remains problematic, and Mozambique and in 2012, Mozambique was ranked at 123 out of 
174 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (African 
Economic Outlook, 2014).  
 
(b) Modernizing regulations and institutions to promote formalization 
 
On the one hand, as indicated above, the state appeared to tolerate informal activity (with the 
exception of trade in some illegal goods). At the same time, it has apparently embraced a 
modernizing agenda, aimed at promoting formalization. Yet, this agenda has incorporated 
developmental elements related to infrastructural and institutional development and 
employment regulation, but also more conservative elements - the persistence of activities 
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undermining moves toward formalization, as outlined in Table 1 below, and explained in the 
following discussion.   
 
Table 1 here  
 
(i) Space and resources 
 
The government has undertaken various initiatives within the broad area of space and 
resources. In urban areas, it has set up formal markets, and encouraged the payment of market 
taxes (ASSOTSI, 2009). However, existing taxation regulations appear to be deterring many 
informal traders from greater formalization: 
 
What they say in Maputo is that there are thousands of spaces available in the legal 
official municipal markets which are not being taken up...People don’t do this because 
if they move into the markets they will have to pay taxes. There have been some 
significant improvements in the municipal markets in terms of electricity and water 
supplies. Down in the main central market down town there is a car park where 
people can park their cars. It’s safe, but they have to pay for it. None the less all these 
people would prefer to sell their stuff on the pavements (Senior Editor, Mozambican 
News Agency, 2009).   
 
Conversely, government assistance has been provided to assist those living in rural districts 
that have tended to be neglected in the past (Director, Mozambican News Agency, 2009). 
Here, the government has created provincial one-stop-shops for business support and advice, 
and provided business start-up loans. The OIL (Orçamente Investemento Locale) government 
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loan programme is aimed at promoting agriculture, to help the peasantry to move away from 
basic subsistence and low level informal trade, to increase food production and generate jobs 
through formal enterprises such as flour mills and brick factories. Recently the provision of 
loans has been accompanied by training in business management (AIM, 2008b). Each of the 
128 local districts is provided with around 300,000 US dollars, depending on the size of the 
population. The assistance is arguably long overdue:    
 
For the first time, the government decided to look after the peasants. And they are the 
ones who fought for independence, but they had been forgotten for more than twenty, 
for thirty years. They were suffering the same way as in colonial times.... There is not 
much improvement but some. Few people go without shoes now (Director, 
Mozambican News Agency, 2009).   
 
However, the administration of the fund still requires improvement: in some cases, the fund 
has been spent on fictitious projects (Director of Mozambican News Agency, 2009).  
 A further measure that the government has encouraged is the provision of 
microfinance. The 1989 Urban Enterprise Credit Fund was established by the World Bank 
and operationalized by the Mozambican Ministry of Labour. By 2005, there were around 
103,000 microfinance beneficiaries and around 32 microfinance operators in the country. 
Microfinance is, however, largely an urban phenomenon- a major constraint is that loans tend 
to be limited to members’ savings. Moreover, interest rates tend to be higher than those 
charged by commercial banks. This may partly explain why the use of informal microfinance 
systems is still higher than that of formal microfinance (de Vletter, 2006).  
 Modernization has also included practices that appear to be aimed at reducing 
informal activity while serving vested interests through the gradual enclosure of the commons 
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in the name of development. During the years of state socialism, all property was state 
owned, a process that has been both officially and unofficially reversed (Arndt, Benfica and 
Thurlow, 2011)iv. An example of change to land use in Maputo is the Marginal, extending 
from the suburb of Sommerschield to the resort of Costa da Sol. During the war and 
immediate post war period, this was lined with the dwellings of artisinal fishermen, informal 
fish markets and other informal enterprises. Over the years, this hive of informal activities 
was replaced by luxury housing. The decline of artisinal fishing around Maputo has also been 
worsened through criminal elements illegally stripping prawn beds (AllAfrica, 2008; c.f. 
AllAfrica, 2011). Nor has such a process been confined to Maputo. For example, in the 
northern coastal town of Pemba, artisinal fishermen and informal traders have been gradually 
marginalized along Wimbe beach, again with their trading and living space being subsumed 
by hotels and luxury housing.  
 
(ii) Institutional development 
 
Recent years have seen developments to a range of institutions including: the role of trade 
unions, banking, customs and schooling (for further in-depth analysis of institutions within 
Mozambique see Wood, Dibben, Stride & Webster, 2010; Dibben & Williams, 2012). 
The OTM union federation was set up in 1983 by the government, but is now 
theoretically independent (Labour Law, 2007). It has 16 affiliated trade unions and around 
250,000 members (Director A, OTM, 2009). A second federation, CONSILMO, was formed 
by three breakaway unions that felt that OTM was too close to the ruling party. Unions in 
Mozambique tend not to organize casual workers (Webster, Wood & Brookes, 2006) or those 
working in the informal sector. However, many of the workers within the informal economy 
are organized by ASSOTSI, as mentioned above. More recently, the OTM union has been 
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considering trying to more actively and directly address the needs of informal sector workers 
(OTM, 2009), which may act to promote formalization, through incorporating these workers 
into mainstream union activities.  
 Although progress has been made on primary education, there still remains an 
inadequate secondary school system (Fauvet, Senior Editor, Mozambican News Agency, 
2009). The government provides vocational training (Labour Law 2007, Article 238). 
However, this is relatively weak and only 15 percent of secondary level students undergo 
formal technical and vocational education and training courses each year. There is also 
sectoral variation: while the transport sector has an active industrial policy, this is not 
extended to all sectors. The government has recognised the need to improve vocational 
training and in 2005 launched a strategic plan for a new co-ordinating body for informal 
sector training, albeit that this has made limited progress (OECD, 2008).  
  
(iii) Business regulations 
 
A range of measures have been introduced which may lead to formalization of small 
businesses including, in 2008, the introduction of a simplified tax for small businesses, 
payable as a percentage of turnover or as a lump sum (Senior Editor, Mozambican News 
Agency, 2009). Under this measure, any company, individual trader or producer with a 
volume of business less than about $100,000 per annum can opt for this tax rather than 
current income, corporation and value added taxes (AIM, 2008a). However, it has not been 
widely taken up: small farmers have to possess an identification card to qualify for tax 
exemptions but 3.5 million farm families do not comply with this regulation (AEO, 2009). 
Moreover, a business can only be registered if the owner has a bank account and a specific 
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amount of capital, a still-in-force colonial law originally introduced with the aim of keeping 
Africans out of business (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2010). 
 One of the other measures that may reduce numbers in the informal economy is 
cooperatives, most notably in agriculture, within a society where most of the population live 
on the land. These organizations have been established for over twenty years in Maputo and 
are highly successful. Most members are women involved in vegetable farming who sell their 
produce in Maputo markets and on the streets. Legislation on cooperatives was passed in 
2008 in order to encourage their growth (Senior Editor, Mozambican News Agency, 2009). 
 
(iii) Employment regulation 
 
Regulation of formal employment might lead to protection of workers, and reduced numbers 
being forced to take up informal sector work. Mozambique has quite a comprehensive 
framework of employment legislation. Various rights were enshrined in the 1990 constitution 
including: freedom of association and trade union organization, the right to strike, a fair 
wage, rest and vacation, and a safe and healthy work environment. Moreover, the Tripartite 
Commission brings together the state, employers and unions, and sets the minimum wage 
(Artur, 2004). Employment legislation was further developed in the 1998 Labour Law and 
2007 Labour Law which covers most private sector employees (but still only applies in 
certain respects to domestic work and mining, private security and rural work). Additional 
collective rights include collective bargaining and participation, while individual rights 
include those relating to: pay; non-standard work; gender discrimination; health and safety; 
and child labour. 
However, there is poor enforcement of health and safety legislation, despite periodic 
crackdowns (AllAfrica.com, 2011b) and differences in wages for white and black 
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Mozambicans (Director of Mozambican News Agency, 2007, 2009), while the role of the 
labour inspectorate is limited due to a lack of resources (Levy, 2003; Artur, 2004). Moreover, 
although child labour is forbidden by law (Labour Law, 2007), it is still widespread. Young 
boys can be observed selling goods on the streets to both tourists and local residents 
(Fieldnotes, September, 2009).   
 Those working in the informal sector are predominantly women, and almost all are 
black Mozambican (President of ASSOTSI, 2009). The disadvantages faced by women and 
Black Mozambicans are likely to continue while informal rules and norms relating to 
patronage persist: 
 
People are appointed by their seniors.  People appoint those below them, and appoint 
on the basis of friendship and trust. There is a level of incompetence. People are 
scared to show things are not going well. It is like a club. There is a politically based 
organization and appointment system. So competence is second and first, do we trust 
them? This may seem irrational if you do not understand the culture.... (Senior 
Manager, Mozambican University, 2007) 
 
Such practices, as Round, Williams & Rodgers (2008) suggest, can encourage participation in 
the informal economy. Those who lack the necessary insider contacts, or the financial 
resources necessary to invest in the patronage required for formal sector work, seek refuge 
and security in the sphere of secure intimate contacts and informality at the communal level. 
In such cases, informality comes to represent a safe haven.   
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(4) CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Mozambique, there is recognition of the legitimacy of the informal sector, and attempts to 
engage with the principal organization representing informal traders.  At the same time, the 
role of the state in assisting formalization has been, as noted above, both conservative and 
progressive. On the one hand, it has increasingly recognized that a large informal sector acts 
as a safety valve, providing marginal livings for the poor, and hence, tolerance may help to 
stabilize the status quo. On the other hand, there have been some efforts to help informal 
traders to formalize their activities through provision of better trading spaces and informal 
sector support. Such efforts can make formalization more attractive (Loayza & Rigolini, 
2011).  
At the same time, there are elements working against change. The state has supported 
the ongoing process of primitive accumulation of space and resources, leading to the 
enriching of some, whilst marginalizing those dependent on informal livings, reflecting the 
re-emergence of expropriation as a feature of contemporary capitalism within many national 
settings (Harvey, 2003). Moreover, the state has apparently ignored the flouting of some 
formal regulations, owing to problems of either capacity or a lack of political will; the 
political costs of imposing regulation may greatly outweigh the benefits of intervening (c.f. 
Ferguson, 1990; Ndawonde, 2009).  Moreover, the informal sector plays a role in disciplining 
labour in the formal sphere through driving down labour standards (Moody, 1997). From an 
employee perspective, downward pressure on wages is made more palatable through the 
visibly bleak alternative of informal sector working, providing little more than basic 
subsistence. The relationship between the proliferation of informal sector working and 
downward pressures on the terms and conditions of formal sector employment deserves 
further investigation. 
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Informality can be highly functional for certain groupings of ‘insiders’ (Nafziger, 
1998), but also capable of underpinning basic subsistence (c.f. Wood & Frynas, 2006). In 
Mozambique, regulation is mediated by both formal and also informal institutions, which can 
be defined as: ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004: 727). An 
‘economy of affection’ includes support in a range of areas such as credit, business 
development, education and community development (Hyden, 1983). Yet, neo-liberal 
prescriptions to curtail the role of the state to reduce its predatory capabilities can in fact 
worsen matters, with weaker regulatory and enforcement encouraging renewed waves of 
primitive accumulation. 
In theoretical terms, this paper highlights the limitations of accounts that focus on 
formal regulation, be it in terms of legal traditions, or formal institutional configurations; 
whilst economic activity may be contingent on institutional mediation, the primary basis of 
regulation may be informal (Jessop, 2001). Hence, a concentration on formal regulatory 
reform may have a less than anticipated impact on practice in this area. This study also points 
to the relative compatibility between specific institutions and embedded rules (Boyer, 2006; 
c.f. Sosthenes, 2008). There is little doubt that institutions are far less closely coupled than in 
advanced societies (c.f. Lane & Wood, 2009).  However, this does not mean that institutions 
do not exist at different levels, or that embedded patterns of behaviour mitigate against 
diffuse diversity within both the formal and informal sectors (ibid). Rather, what is clear is 
that institutions are ambivalent and polyvalent, and that, in seeking to gain advantage, 
different players may work towards or against more effective institutional coverage and 
associated regulation. Within the informal sector, there is much variation on gender, regional 
and sectoral lines; women outside of the greater Maputo metropole are generally in a more 
precarious position than men working within it. Within the rural periphery, much of the 
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peasantry operate in a relatively closed subsistence-based economy, with weak or absent 
formal regulation and service provision. Here, there is a continuing need for government 
policies that will enable marginalised workers such as women to access better paid 
employment (Oya and Sender, 2009), leading to broader economic development. These 
policies are in line with the International Labour Organisation’s proposed strategy for integrating 
policy in order to enable the formalising of work. The strategy argues for action in areas such as job 
creation, economic growth, enforcement of international labour standards and employment rights, 
equality, and both rural and urban development (ILO, 2013 in Williams and Lansky, 2013). Within 
the urban core in Mozambique, whilst formal regulation may again be limited, informal 
sector operators have to engage at a range of levels with the authorities, involving resource 
exchanges, reciprocity and omissions, in a manner that imparts predictability to exchange 
relations. On the one hand, informal regulation assumes a vital role in the event of formal 
regulatory failure. On the other hand, partially decoupled regulatory institutions, and over-
reliance on the informal, and an associated diminishment of the potential role of the state, 
makes for a greater volatility, and cannot provide the basis for a stable and predictable 
trajectory of economic growth (Boyer, 2006; c.f. Hanlon, 2004). 
A limitation of much of the socio-economic neo-institutionalist literature on tropical 
Africa is that one is sometimes left with general calls for better institutions (see Wood & 
Frynas, 2006). Yet, effective institutions depend on meaningful social compromises between 
broad interest groupings, which in turn, are contingent on effective grassroots mobilisation 
and organization, forcing compromise by changing the status quo (Ferguson, 1990). The 
progress of ASSOTSI notwithstanding, such mobilization remains, at the time of writing, a 
seemingly distant prospect (c.f. Hanlon, 2004; Harrison, 2000). A key factor here might be 
the way in which informal activities effectively subsidise formal 
ones (through explicit outsourcing or making some goods and services 
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cheaper for formal sector producers) - the distinction between formality and informality is not 
always clear (Chen, 2007). Earlier research has indicated the permeable boundaries between 
legal, illegal, and even supra-legal commercial activity in Mozambique, making it difficult to 
draw an absolute distinction between them. Examples include the fishing and hardwood 
industries, and certain import-export activities (Roper and Wood, 2003). Moreover, dramatic 
change from below does not seem realistic given Mozambique’s troubled past, since the 
country needs to build economic development while at the same time maintaining social and 
political stability. Hence, whilst formalization matters, there is little doubt that the process is 
likely to be both difficult and contested.  In countries such as Mozambique that have faced a 
troubled past, it should arguably be accepted by local and international institutions that the 
way forward will entail incremental change.  
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Notes 
i In this paper we are not suggesting that modernization necessarily implies the adoption of a 
Western (e.g. US model), Asian (Korean, Japanese), or any other existent approach to work 
organization.  The focus is on the regulation and institutions necessary for promoting the 
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formalization of work and conversely, the conservative tendencies inhibiting change in this 
respect. 
ii It is worth noting that the Tunisian revolution was sparked off by the self-immolation of an 
informal trader who was denied the means for a basic living by the authorities. 
iii The authors have personal experience of this 
iv For many years, property transactions took the form of informal measures, such as the sale 
of keys to properties.  More formally speaking, property may now be leased for 99 years. 
Individuals may physically own any improvements they have made to a parcel of land.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 The modernization of regulations and institutions 
 
 Formalisation through 
modernizing regulations 
and institutions 
‘Conservative’ elements 
associated with 
modernization 
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Space and resources Setting up formal markets 
Market taxes 
Regional grants for small 
business development 
Business support 
Removal of informal sector 
workers from land- 
accumulation by 
dispossession 
Mismanagement of regional 
grants to small business 
 
Business regulations Tax incentives for small 
businesses 
Regulations promoting 
cooperatives 
Lack of business registration  
Institutional 
development   
Trade unions 
Schooling and vocational 
training 
 
 
Secondary level education 
underdeveloped 
Limited skills development 
for informal sector workers 
 
Employment 
regulation 
Labour law protecting job 
security 
Moves toward gender 
equality 
Lack of enforcement of 
health and safety 
Persistence of child labour 
Gender differences in 
employment 
Informal institutions 
regulating work / patronage 
 
